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Abstract 
We tackled the conflicts on locally unwanted land uses (LULU) focusing on the false consensus 
effect (FCE). Through a secondary analysis of data from a representative sample of residents in the 
district area of Turin, Italy, where a high-speed railway (HSR) should be sited (N = 1785), we tested 
whether the FCE mediates the relationship between perceived threat to the place and mobilization 
against the HRS. Participants tended to overestimate the number of people holding their same 
opinion. Among the participants against the HSR (n = 305), the tendency to incur in the FCE was 
higher for who perceived the project as a threat to the place. Moreover, the perception of an alleged 
consensus around one’s own opinion mobilized them to defend their position. Our study suggested 
that standard approaches to LULU conflicts may benefit from the use of socio-cognitive variables. 
Strengths and limitations of the study are discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
In the last decade public opposition to the siting of new energy and transport infrastructures 
has been growing in many countries all over the world (Saint, Flavell, & Fox, 2009). In Italy the 
number of conflicts over local unwanted land uses (LULU) has systematically increased since 2005. 
In 2012 the Nimby Forum Observatory (www.nimbyforum.it) surveyed 354 conflicts, 151 more 
than in 2011. According to these data, the majority of the oppositions (62.7%) criticized power 
stations such as hydroelectric and thermoelectric stations, power lines, biomass power plants, 
photovoltaic installations, and wind farms. Protests against waste disposal units (mainly landfills 
and incinerators) totaled 28.3%, and opposition to transport infrastructures amounted to 7.6% of the 
cases surveyed. Although LULU conflicts are not new or unusual in history, they are still one of the 
most complex issues affecting communities. The often-intractable nature of such conflicts, and the 
challenges they pose to decision makers and communities have fuelled animated political debates 
and stimulated a substantial amount of scientific research on the topic. According to early reviews 
such as Kraft and Clary’s (1991, pp. 302-303), this kind of protests are characterized by: “(1) 
distrust of project sponsors; (2) limited information about the siting issue; (3) attitudes towards the 
project that are local and parochial, and which do not consider broader ramification; (4) an 
emotional orientation towards the conflict; and (5) a high level of concern about project risks”.  
This interpretation led the first researchers into this topic to label as NIMBY (Not In My 
Backyard) these kind of protests (e.g., Dear, 1992; Piller, 1991). The implicit assumptions 
underlying the NIMBY paradigm were apparently built on a set of values, which led researchers to 
associate the alleged self-interest of the local opponents to irrational conducts and selfish attitudes, 
while simultaneously overlooking the equally self-interested motives of the proponents. Moreover, 
the early and conventional NIMBY view completely neglected the issues of democracy and power 
that were entailed in the conflicts revolving around unwanted land uses, and the related conflicting 
dynamics between top-down and bottom-up decision-making processes, as well as between 
authorities operating at different territorial levels, namely local and national authorities. 
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The NIMBY paradigm, holding that groups opposing unwanted facilities are ill-informed, 
irrational, and/or selfish, has been widely criticized. Evidence-based research showed that LULU 
mobilizations are often rationally based (Takahashi & Gaber, 1998), that the attitude toward the 
facility does not depend on the knowledge of its details (Dietz, Stern, & Rycroft, 1989), nor on its 
distance from participants’ area of residence (Martin & Myers, 2005), and that egoism is not among 
the main reasons of these mobilizations (Zald & McCarthy, 1987). Thus, empirical findings showed 
that the concept embedded in the NIMBY label is inappropriate to describe and explain LULU 
conflicts (Burningham, Barnett, & Thrush, 2006; Wolsink, 2000, 2006).  
Following this critical approach to the conventional view, the siting literature has identified a 
number of environmental, social, and psychological factors that are likely to foster a negative 
response to unwanted facilities: (a) the aesthetic impact of the facility itself, and relationships with 
out-siders (Hagget, 2011); (b) the type of facility, and the clarity of choice (Esaiasson, 2014); (c) 
values concerning environmental injustice and the fairness of the siting process (Wolsink & 
Devillee, 2009); (d) unwanted consequences, such as health and material concerns, and detrimental 
changes in quality of life (Schively, 2007); (e) perception of risks associated to the facility (Hunter 
& Leyden, 1995; Pol, Di Masso, Castrechini, Bonet, & Vidal, 2006; Wu, Zhai, Li, Ren & Tsuchida, 
2014); and (f) trust in the authorities, decision makers, and development organizations (Groothuis & 
Miller, 2005; Gross, 2007). Most important for this study, along with the studies that addressed 
specific and discrete aspects of each project, a second strand of research has focused on two other 
environmental psychological issues. On the one hand, on the notion of place and the psychological 
ties with places (i.e., place attachment, and place identity): LULU oppositions can be deemed as 
place-protective actions that arise when the projects threaten place-based identities and their 
realization is likely to disrupt the emotional bonds that residents establish with the meaningful 
places in which they live or with whom they identify with (Devine-Wright, 2009).  
Place identity and place attachment are concepts built upon the assumption that the symbolic 
valence of the environment affects the way individuals conceive and describe themselves (Wester-
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Herber, 2004). Specifically, place identity denotes the psychological counterpart of the physical 
features of a location in terms of meaning and emotions (Devine-Wright, 2009). Environmental 
research on a variety of territorial communities demonstrated that a stable, meaningful and valuable 
experience of a place of residence can contribute to fostering a positive individual sense of self 
(Nowell, Berkowitz, Deacon, & Foster-Fishman, 2006), but that individuals are not always totally 
aware of their emotional attachment to place. However, they are likely to increase their awareness 
when an event forces them to leave it (Fried, 2000) or threatens to disrupt this bond, as in the case 
of land uses that have a deep impact on the place itself. According to this perspective, LULU 
oppositions are likely to emerge whenever a perceived negative change in the place of residence is 
likely to occur. Although there may be territorial communities characterized by feeble place 
attachment feelings and weak, or ambivalent, or even negative place identities, the extant siting 
literature reports the importance of such dimensions in LULU conflicts.  
Indeed, studies such as those by Vorkinn and Riese (2001), Devine-Wright and Howes 
(2010), and Devine-Wright (2013) showed that, along with project-related variables, high levels of 
place attachment and of perceived environmental injustice predict low acceptance of land use 
changes. Jacquet and Stedman’s (2014) expanded this argument by suggesting that the anticipated 
risk or threat of disruption to place and community meanings and identities can prod opposition. All 
of these studies emphasized the impact exerted on public response to unwanted facilities by 
perceived threat, either to residents’ quality of life (Pol et al., 2006), to their personal wellbeing 
(Moser, 2009), or to their emotional bonds with places and place-based identities (Devine-Wright, 
2009).  
On the other hand, a second strand of research has focused on the notion of environmental 
justice, arguing that residents legitimately demand to be treated fairly by the facility’s proponents 
and the authorities, and to be significantly involved in all of the decisions in play (Bullard, 2000). 
The current study continues on this line of research by examining the impact of perceived 
threat to places on the opposition to the siting of a high-speed railway (HSR) in the Susa Valley (for 
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details on the facility, see below). Most importantly, our investigation introduces an additional and 
hitherto unexplored variable in the siting literature, namely the of false consensus (FCE) socio-
cognitive bias.  
2. Socio-cognitive biases in conflicts over land uses: The false consensus effect 
All LULU oppositions give raise to social conflicts, or insert themselves into pre-existing 
ones. From a socio-psychological perspective, social conflicts can be analyzed through the lens of 
inter-group dynamics, which the most part of social psychologists assume to develop from the basic 
process of social categorization. Decades of research have shown that the social categorization 
processes affect the way individuals and groups perceive the others and shape their mutual 
relationships. Specifically, the social categorization process entails the tendency to positively 
evaluate the groups to which individuals belong (i.e., the ingroups) and to negatively evaluate the 
external groups (i.e., the outgroups). This tendency, referred to as the intergroup bias, has been 
acknowledged as a general phenomenon, which is nevertheless likely to be intensified by a number 
of factors, such as ingroup identification, ingroup and outgroup status, and threat (for a review, see 
Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002).  
Among the numerous manifestations of the intergroup bias, our study focuses on the false 
consensus effect. With the exception of two Italian study that have explored the role of some socio-
cognitive biases in LULU conflicts, namely Russo’s (2009) on paranoid social cognition, and 
Roccato, Orazio, and Mannarini’s (in press) on the ingroup overexclusion effect, at present the 
siting literature has never considered this type of variables to predict public opposition to unwanted 
facilities. 
The FCE has been defined as the tendency to overestimate the commonness of one’s own 
responses (opinions, preferences, and behaviors) (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977). Such a distortion 
has been explained based on four main processes (see Marks & Miller, 1987; Verlhiac, 2000). First, 
selective exposure and cognitive availability. As normally people tend to relate to others who are 
similar to themselves, examples of agreement are more readily and frequently accessible from 
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memory than example of disagreement. This induces individuals to overestimate consensus for their 
own opinion. Second, salience and focus of attention. When individuals focus on their own 
preferred position, instead of considering more than one or alternative positions, they are likely to 
inflate support for that position, as that is the most salient in the sphere of their immediate 
consciousness. Third, logical information processing. The FCE may be explained as the result of a 
causal attribution process, according to which individuals tend to explain their behaviors and 
opinions by attributing the causes to situational, as opposed to dispositional, forces. This tendency 
should result in perceived augmented consensus for the considered opinion or behavior. Fourth, and 
most important for this study, motivation. The motivational hypothesis refers to the tendency of the 
individuals to use the positioning of the self and others to validate the accuracy and correctness of 
their position, to strengthen perceived social support, and to maintain or restore self-esteem. From 
this perspective, the FCE functions as a self-defensive or self-enhancement mechanism, that may 
increase under the effect of situational factors, such as ambiguity, uncertainty, and, interestingly for 
this study, threat. Indeed, as shown by Sherman, Presson, and Chassin (1984), when individuals 
perceive a threat to the self or to their ingroup, they are motivated to seek support for their own 
positions and therefore to perceive increased consensus.  
In LULU conflicts, the FCE should be related to the perception that many others (more than 
they actually are) within the community or in the public opinion share the same position of the 
perceiver on the controversial project. It is realistic to postulate that both opponents and supporters 
should overestimate consensus for their respective position, though the literature agree that such a 
bias is more likely to characterize minority groups. Indeed, minorities seem to have a greater need 
than majorities for seeking acknowledgement and legitimateness for their position (Sanders & 
Mullen, 1983; Suls & Wan, 1987). These findings are consistent with a motivational perspective 
that accentuates the need to justify counter-normative behaviors. Based on the findings from both 
the LULU and the FCE literature, which concurrently suggest that threat affects both the false 
consensus bias and the opposition to unwanted facilities, the current study aims at establishing a 
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direct relationship between the FCE and protest behavior in LULU conflicts. Evidence that the FCE 
affects behavior has been found by Botvin, Botvin, Baker, Dusenbury, and Goldberg (1992) in their 
research on adolescents’ tobacco use, and by Bauman and Geher (2002), who showed that the FCE 
predicts behavioral intentions regarding important social issues, such as abortion, death penalty, 
animal testing, legalization of drugs, ban on gun sales, ban on smoking in public places, racial 
quotas, and others. 
3. The present study 
In this study we focused on an Italian movement against the construction of a high speed 
railway in the Susa Valley (near Turin, North-Western Italy). This railway project is designed to 
link the cities of Turin and Lyon within a European plan of high speed railway network. The anti-
HSR movement was born in the early 1990s in the Susa Valley, and from the autumn 2005, when 
some clashes with the police occurred, progressively became more and more spread across the 
district area of Turin. After these episodes the movement and the HSR project gained much media 
visibility (Mannarini & Roccato, 2011). By the end of 2006, about two-thirds of the Susa Valley 
residents (62.7% according to Campana, Dallago, & Roccato, 2007, and 64.4% according to 
Mannarini, Roccato, Fedi, & Rovere, 2009) were against the siting of the new railway.  
We used secondary data collected in the district area of Turin to investigate whether residents 
have a biased perception of the commonness of their own opinion about the HSR project. More 
specifically, based on Marks and Miller (1987) and on Verlhiac (2000), we expected that residents 
in Turin district area would show the FCE, independently of whether they approved or disapproved 
the HRS project. Thus, we hypothesized that citizens approving the project would overestimate the 
number of people supporting the HRS and, conversely, that citizens disapproving it would 
overestimate the number of people opposing the HRS (HP1).  
Our second goal was to test whether the FCE mediates the relationship between perceived 
threat to the Susa Valley and participation in the protest against the HRS. Given that this second 
goal was specifically focused on the link between the FCE and engagement in protest behaviors, we 
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decided here to limit our investigation to the subsample of respondents that disapproved the HRS 
project. Generally speaking, based on Bullard (2000) and Devine-Wright (2009, 2013; Devine-
Wright & Howes, 2010), we expected that perceived threat to the Susa Valley would be positively 
linked with engagement in protest against the HSR, and that this relationship would be at least 
partially explained (i.e., mediated) by the FCE (HP2). More in detail, we hypothesized that threat 
perception would be positively linked with the FCE (Sherman, Presson, & Chassin, 1984), and that 
resorting to the FCE would show a positive relation with the likelihood of taking part in 
demonstrations against the construction of the HSR (Bauman & Geher, 2002; Botvin et al., 1992).  
4. Materials and method 
We performed a secondary analysis of the data collected by the Osservatorio del Nord Ovest 
(North-Western Observatory, www.nordovest.org), a research institute of the University of Turin, in 
September 2006. The Osservatorio del Nord Ovest surveys via mail, three times per year, a panel of 
participants, stratified to be representative of different concentric populations, i.e., those living in 
Turin, in the Turin district area, in Piedmont, in Northern Italy, and in the whole Italy. In this 
research we used the sample rooted in the Turin district area, the Italian county where the HSR 
should be placed (N = 1785, men = 50.0%, mean age = 54.36, SD = 15.23, redemption rate = 47.21) 
was representative of the residents in Torino district area, the Italian county where the HSR should 
be placed.  
Participants’ were asked questions related to socio-demographic characteristics, attitudes and 
behaviors towards economic, political, and sociocultural issues. The questions about the HSR were 
just a small section of the questionnaire, and the only purpose of the Osservatorio was to obtain 
information to describe citizens’ perceptions and attitudes toward the new railway project.. The 
complete questionnaire is available at the Osservatorio’s website. We used five sets of variables.  
1. Control variables: gender, age, and education (years of formal education). 
2. Attitude toward the HSR. Respondents were asked whether they were in favor of the HSR 
(“completely favorable” or “quite favorable”) or not (“quite unfavorable” or “completely 
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unfavorable”). Based on these data, we computed a dichotomous variable assessing participants’ 
attitude toward the project.  
3. Estimate of the quota of Susa Valley residents mobilized against the HSR. We asked to the 
respondents the following question: “In your opinion, how many people living in the Susa Valley 
are involved in the anti-HSR movement? A small minority of the residents; A large number, but 
less than the 50%, of the residents; A large number, above the 50% of the residents; The 
overwhelming majority of the residents”. Given that previous research showed that in 2006 48% of 
the residents were involved in the anti- HSR protest (Campana et al., 2007), the correct, unbiased 
answer would be the second one. Participant with a favorable attitude toward the HSR who chose 
the first alternative and participants with an unfavorable attitude toward the HSR who chose the 
third or the fourth alternative have been considered as people resorting to the FCE (= 1), while the 
other participants have been classified as people not resorting to this bias (= 0).  
4. Perceived threat to the Susa Valley. Like Campana et al. (2007), we used the following 
four-category Likert item: “The HSR would irreparably damage the Susa Valley”. Response 
alternative ranged from “I completely disagree” to “I completely agree”. 
5. Participation against the HSR. Like Mannarini et al. (2009) we used the following item: 
“Did you take part into actions (e.g. public demonstrations, petitions, public meetings) against the 
HSR in the last 12 months” (No = 0; Yes = 1). 
5. Results 
To test HP1 we analyzed the relation between participants’ attitude toward the HSR and their 
estimate of the number of Susa Valley residents opposing the facility. The two variables showed a 
significant relation, 2(3) = 264.885, p < .001, = .42. Adjusted standardized residual analysis 
showed that both people in favor and people not in favor of the facility resorted to the FCE (see 
Table 1).1  
                                                       
1 Adjusted standardized residuals show which cells of a contingency table are significantly associated. When > 2.00 
they show a significant positive association, while when < - 2.00 they show a significant negative association. 
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To test HP2, we tested a mediation model (using MPlus, estimator WLSMV) on the 
subsample or respondents who reported a negative attitude toward the HSR (n = 305). As shown in 
Figure 1 (standardized parameters are reported), consistent with HP2, perceived threat to the Susa 
Valley showed a positive link with the probability of taking part in actions against the HSR. This 
effect was partially mediated by the FCE. Indeed, perceived threat to the Susa Valley showed a 
positive link with the FCE (R2 = .06) which, in turn, showed a positive relation with participation in 
protests against the HSR. The indirect effect between perceived threat and participation was 
statistically significant (indirect effect = .12, p < .01). As a whole, our model allowed us to explain 
about one fifth of the variance of our dependent variable (R2 = .19). None of the socio-demographic 
control variables we used (gender, age, and education) showed a significant relation with perceived 
threat, false consensus, and participation. 
6. Discussion 
In our study we addressed the role played by individual perceptions of the public opinion in 
reinforcing protest behaviors to LULU works. We first showed that citizens tend to overestimate the 
number of people that hold their same opinion on a new infrastructure project, incurring in what has 
been labeled the “false consensus effect” (Ross et al., 1977). This cognitive bias seems to be 
pervasive: Not only people opposing the project think that their position is shared by the majority, 
but this is true also for people approving the project. Previous studies on the FCE focused on the 
differences between the perceptions of people favoring and opposing an issue (De La Haye, 2000; 
Muellen & Hu, 1988), largely ignoring the actual (dis)approval of the issue in the population. This 
has mainly been the consequence of the unavailability of generalizable data: We overcame this 
limitation by analyzing the FCE in a representative sample.  
Second, focusing on people disapproving the project, we showed that the tendency to incur 
in the false consensus bias is stronger for those who perceive the new project as highly threatening; 
also, the false consensus bias triggers the motivation to engage in protest behaviors against the 
project. On the whole, the results suggested that resorting to the false consensus bias in LULU 
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conflicts seems to function as a defensive or adaptive response to real or perceived threat 
represented by the new work and the proponents of it. In addition, the results demonstrated that the 
perception of wide consensus around one’s own opinion (independently of whether it is real or not) 
mobilizes people to defend or give high visibility to their position. This process stands as a 
complement of the spiral of silence process (Noelle-Neuman, 1984): Just as people who believe, 
based on their perception of what everybody else thinks, to be in a minority position do not speak 
out and tend to remain silent, our findings suggested that those who believe to be in a majority 
position are ready to stand up and publically defend their position. This is also in line with Bauman 
and Geher’s (2002) suggestion that the false consensus effect can be seen as a distortion of social 
norms perceptions: The false consensus over a social issue (the high-speed train in this case) can 
predict behavioral intentions related to that issue (participating in public manifestations against the 
high-speed train project).  
Generally speaking, after those by Russo (2009) and by Roccato et al. (in press), our study 
confirms that standard approaches to LULU conflicts may benefit from the use of socio-cognitive 
variables, that might help researchers to understand the reasons of local mobilizations against 
unwanted facilities and of the well-established threat-mobilization link (e.g., Devine-Wright, 2009; 
Moser, 2009; Pol et al., 2006).  
More in detail, our findings have interesting implications for the role of the false consensus 
effect in conflicts dynamics. On the one hand, the FCE facilitates the public manifestation of dissent 
and, more in general, of voice behaviors, mainly because it offers a basis for social legitimization. 
On the other hand, the FCE plausibly promotes a delegitimization of the counterpart, with a high 
risk of boosting radicalizations of the conflict and with a subsequent difficulty in handling the 
dispute. In this light, trying to reduce or limit the FCE when it comes to LULU conflicts can be one 
strategy to open up or favoring the legitimization of the counterpart’s point of view. According to 
the literature, the reduction of the FCE could be pursued in two ways. The first is to favor the 
contact with diverse opinions (Woicieszack & Price, 2009) through public debates in which all the 
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stances could have the same visibility and legitimacy with the purpose of contrasting selective 
exposure and disproportioned self-focused attention. The second is to build and provide the citizens 
with an informative framework on the contested project with the purpose of providing cognitive 
instruments that could contain the negative emotional reactions to the project itself and its possible 
consequences. Not by accident, these actions, i.e., exposure to diversity and thorough and unbiased 
information, are built-in a variety of participatory approaches to decision-making processes, 
especially those inspired to deliberative democracy theory (Elster, 1998; Fishkin & Laslett, 2003). 
On the whole, our study has some strong points. First, we used a representative sample of 
the population living around the area where the HSR should be placed. Thus, contrary to what 
systematically happens in standard research in social and environmental psychology (that is often 
based on student samples), we presented results based on generalizable data. Moreover, in research 
on the FCE the presence of false consensus is often inferred by the presence of an asymmetry in the 
perception of the frequency of an opinion or of a behavior between people in favor and against an 
issue. This does not allow the researcher to identify who is actually resorting to false consensus. On 
the contrary, we could classify our respondents into people resorting vs. not resorting to the FCE by 
using factual information of the opinion about the HSR gained in surveys involving local residents. 
This helped us to connect empirically the literature on LULU conflicts with that on socio-cognitive 
biases.  
 As in all the studies, also this one has some limitations. First of all, we relied on cross-
sectional data: Thus, we could not test any causal effect between the variables used in the study. 
Drawing from previous research, we hypothesized that threat perception would influence the 
frequency of incurring in the false consensus bias which, in turn, would mobilize residents to take 
part in protest actions. However, we could not rule out the alternative hypothesis that being 
involved in protest actions drives the overestimation of the personal position’s commonness. New, 
experimental research is needed to rule out this alternative link between the variable we analyzed. 
Second, we had to limit our analyses on the mediating role of the FCE to a specific subsample of 
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respondents, i.e. those who disapproved the HRS project. This choice was due to the unavailability 
of information related to the engagement in public actions in favor of the HRS project. New 
research aimed at testing the symmetry of the relations we have focused on between people in favor 
and against the contested facility would be interesting. Third, we relied on a sample of residents in 
the district of Turin, a geographic area that include, but is not limited to, the Susa Valley. Even 
though it has been shown that participation in protests against LULU projects is much more 
affected by the perception of the negative consequences of the work itself than by the distance 
between the place where the work will be sited and where the respondents live, it could be 
interesting to verify whether these results hold also in a population more directly affected by the 
LULU work, such as people living in Susa Valley.  
7. Conclusions  
This study shed some new light on the processes leading to LULU conflicts. On the one hand, 
it showed new, interesting opportunities to explain them by integrating a socio-cognitive variable in 
classic explanatory models used in this field of research. On the other hand, it might be used as a 
basis to manage these conflict in a more effective and adequate way, aimed to help people not to 
resort to the FCE and thus not to radicalize LULU conflicts. 
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Table 1.  
Estimate of the Val Susa residents opposing the HSR by attitude toward the HSR 
 Negative attitude toward the 
HSR 
Positive attitude toward the 
HSR 
A small minority of the 
residents 
4  
(- 7.3) 
207  
(7.3) 
A large number, but less than 
the 50%, of the residents 
57  
(- 9.4) 
563  
(9.4) 
A large number, above the 
50% of the residents 
102  
(3.9) 
260  
(- 3.9) 
The overwhelming majority of 
the residents 
149  
(13.9) 
146  
(- 13.9) 
Total  312 1176 
 
Note. Frequencies are reported in cells and adjusted standardized residuals in parentheses. 
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Figure caption.  
 
Figure 1. Prediction of participation in actions against the HSR via perceived threat to the Susa 
Valley and FCE 
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Figure 1. 
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